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Thomas Aquinas SUMMA THEOLOGICA PRIMA SECUNDAE The Political Order compared wit

Thomas Aquinas SUMMA THEOLOGICA PRIMA SECUNDAE The Political Order compared with the Divine and Natural Order. (Qu. 72, Art. 4.) There is a threefold order to be found in man. The first is that which derives from the rule of reason: in so far as all our actions and experiences should be commensurate with the guidance of reason. The second arises from comparison with the rule of divine law, which should be our guide in all things. And if man were actually a solitary anima1, this double order would suffice: but because mall is naturally a social and political ani- mal, as is proved in I. Politics, chap. 2, it is necessary that there should be a third order, regulating the conduct of man to his fellows with whom he has to live. 4. LAW IN GENERAL. (Qu. 90.) The Nature of Law. (Art. 1, concl.) Law is a rule or measure of action in virtue of which one is led to perform certain actions and restrained from the performance of others. The term "law" derives [etymolo- gically] from "binding," because by it one is bound to a certain course of action. But the rule and measure of human action is reason, which is the first principle of human action: this is clear from what we have said elsewhere. It is reason which directs action to its appropriate end; and this, according to the philosopher, is the first principle of all activity. Reason and Will in Law. (Ibib. ad 3um.) Reason has power to move to action from the will, as we have shown already: for reason enjoins all that is necessary to some end, in virtue of the fact that that end is desired. But will, if it is to have the authority of law, must be regulated by reason when it commands. It is in this sense that we should understand the saying that the will of the prince has the power of law.' In any other sense the will of the prince becomes an evil rather that law . The Object of Law is the Common Good (Ibid., Art. 2, concl.) Since every part bears the same relation to its whole as the imperfect to the perfect, and since one man is a part of that perfect whole which is the community, it follows that the law must have as its proper object the well-being of the whole community. So the philosopher, in his definition of what pertains to law, makes mention both of happiness and of political union. He says (Ethics, V, chap. 1): 'We call that legal and just which makes for and preserves the well-being of the community through common political action': and the perfect community is the city, as is shown ill the first book of the Politic-'s (chap. 1). . Who has the right to promulgate Law (Ibid. Art. 3, concl.) Law, strictly understood, has as its first and principal object the ordering of the common good. But to order affairs to the common good is the task either of the whole community or of some one person who represents it. Thus the promulgation of law is the business either of the whole community or of that political person whose duty is the care of the common good. Here as ill every other case it is the one who decrees the end who also decrees the means thereto. (Ibid. ad 2um.) A private person has no authority to compel right living. He may only advise; but if his advice is not accepted he has no power of compulsion. But law, to be effective in promoting right living must have such compelling force; as the Philosopher says (X Eth- ics, Chap. 9). But the power of compulsion belongs either to the community as a whole, or to its official representative whose duty it is to il1flict penalties, as we shall see later. He alone, therefore, has the right to make laws. (Ibid., ad 3um.) Just as one man is a member of a family, so a household forms part of a city: but a city is a perfect community, as is shown in the first book of the Politics. Similarly, as the well-being of one man is not a final end, but is subordinate to the common good, so also the well-being of any household must be subordinate to the interests of the city, which is a perfect community. So the head of a family may make certain rules and regulations, but not such as have, properly speaking, the force of law. Definition of Law (Ibid., Art. 4., concl.) From the foregoing we may gather the correct definition of law. It is nothing else than a rational ordering of things which concern the common good; promulgated by whoever is charged with the care of the community. 5. THE VARIOUS TYPES OF LAW. (Qu. 91.) The Eternal Law. (Art. 1., concl.) As we have said above, law is nothing else but a certain dictate of the practical reason "in the prince" who rules a perfect community. It is clear, however, supposing the world to be governed by divine providence as we demonstrated in the First Part,2 that the whole community of the Universe is governed by the divine reason. Thus the rational guidance of created things on the part of God, as the Prince of the Universe, has the quality of law. ..This we can call the eternal law. The Natural Law. (Art. 2, concl.) Since all things which are subject to divine providence are measured and regulated by the eternal law--as we have already shown--it is clear that all things participate to some degree in the eternal law; in so far as they derive from it certain inclinations to those actions and aims which are proper to them. But, of all others, rational creatures aloe subject to divine providence in a very special way; being themselves made participators in providence itself, in that they control their own actions and the actions of others. So they have a certain share in the divine reason itself, derving there from a natural inclination to such actions and ends as are fitting. This participation in the eternal law by rational creatures is called tile natural law. Thus when the Psalmist said (Psalm IV, 6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," he added, as though being asked the question, what is the sacrifice of justice, "Many say, who sheweth us good things?", and then replied, saying: "The light of They countenance, 0 Lord, is signed upon us." As though the light of natural reason, by which we discern good from evil, and which is the natural law, were nothing else than the impression of the divine light in us. So it is clear that the natural law is nothing else than the participation of tile eternal law in rational creatures. Human Law (Art. 3., concl.) Just as in speculative reason we proceed from indemonstrable principles, naturally known, to the conclusions of the various sciences, such conclusions not being innate but arrived at by the use of reason; so also the human reason has to proceed from tile precepts of the natural law, as though from certain common and indemonstrable principles, to other more particular dispositions. And such particular dispositions, arrived at by an effort of reason, are called human laws: provided that the other conditions necessary to all law, which we have already noted, are observed. So Cicero says (De Invent.Rhetor.II, 53): "Law springs in its first beginnings from nature: then such standards as are judged to be useful become established by custom: finally reverence and holiness add their" sanction to what springs from nature and is established by custom." The Necessity for Divine Law. (Art., 4, concl.) In addition to natural law and to human law there had of necessity to be also a divine law to direct human life: and this for four reasons. In the first place because it is by law that man is directed in his actions with respect to his final end. If, therefore, man were destined to an end which was no more than proportionate to his natural faculties, there would be no need for him to have any directive on the side of reason above the natural law and humanly enacted law which is derived from it. But because man is des- tined to an end of eternal blessedness, and this exceeds what is proportionate to natural human faculties as we have already shown, it was necessary that he should be directed to this end not merely by natural and human law, but also by a divinely given law.-- Secondly: because of the uncertainty of human judgement, particularly ill matters that are contingent and specific, it is often the case that very differing judgements are passed by various people on human activities; and from these there proceed different, and even contrary, laws. In order, therefore, that man should know without any doubt what he is to do and what to uploads/Finance/ st-thomas-aquinas-legal-naturalism.pdf